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NOTE AND COMMENT.
TH4 Er vcT o THE CARMACK 'AMENDMENT TO THE HEPBURN ACT UPON
LIMITATION BY COMMON ,CARRIERS O TlE _ AMOUNT OF THEIR LIABILITYTwo
cases, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on MAarch IO, 1913,
may be considered together. They are developments of the cases reviewed
in II MICH. L. Rzv. 460. Plaintiff shipped -two boxes and a ,barrel of 'house-
hold goods" under an agreement that the goods, in case of loss, -should be
valued at $5 per hundred-weight. One box, weighing not over 200 pounds
and actually -worth $75, was lost. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed
a judgment against the carrier for the full value. 91 Ark. 97, 121 S. W. 932,
134 A. S. R. 56. On error the Supreme Court of the United ,States reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Kansas City Southern Ry.
Co. v. Carl, 33 Sup. Ct. 39r. In the other oase the plaintiff Ghipped -four bulls
and thirteen cows, "show cattle," worth $io,64o. The 'finding of the "Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, 128 6. W. 932, was reversed on the ground that the
recovery should have been limited to $3o for each bull and $2o for each cow,
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in accordance with the bill of lading. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v.
Harriman Bros., 33 'Sup. Ct. 397.
In ii MICH. L. RLV. 46o, the Croninger and Miller cases ,were reviewed
with the concluding statement that further decisions on this question will
be awaited with interest. We now have these further cases. They dispose of
some of the open questions, but not even these give a final answer to the
question of the validity of an arbitrary valuation in a ,bill of lading, -bearing
no relation to the known value of the goods shipped, which has been fixed by
carrier and shipper for the alleged -purpose of securing a lower rate of ship-
ment, under an agreement -that goods are shipped "at owner's risk," but 'with
an option to ship "at carrier's risk" at a bigher rate. In neither of these
cases does it appear that the carrier knew the true value of the goods, and
the court expressly says that in this decision they "lay on one side, as not
fiere involved, every question which might arise when it is shown thai the
carrier intentionaly connived 'with the shipper to give him an illegal rate,
thereby causing a discrimination or preference forbidden -by the positive
terms of the act of Congress and made punishable as a crime." In the first
case household goods 'were shipped, and these are not ordinarily valued by
the hundred-weight, nor are such goods usually shipped 'when they are worth
as little as $5 per hundred-weight. However, it is conceivable that one might
ship such goods, and as -they were in this case in boxes and barrels, the
carrier 'had no means, except the statement of the shipper, 'by 'which to
determine their value. In the second case very valuable animals were
shipped. It 'would 'be a poor sort of a bull that is 'worth only $30 or a cow
that is valued at $2o, but there are such, and it appears that the agent never
saw these cattle.
It is perfectly plain that not all animals of a kind have the same fixed
value. The court, however, finds that it is not unreasonable, for the purpose
of fixing freight rates and publishing tariffs, to make two classifications;
those above and those below A fixed maximum amount. This, the court says,
is the only practicable method and 'has been administratively approved by
the Commerce Commission. The quotation the court gives, however, from
the finding of the Commission, approves of a graduation of rates in accord-
ance with the actual, values of specific commodities. It does not say that all
commodities of less than a certain value shall be shipped at one rate, and all
like commodities worth more than that amount, no -matter how much more,
shall be shipped at another rate, with no variations for intermediate valuations.
Not only does the court approve of such a classification, but it 'holds that the,,
shipper must take notice of it, and if he ships goods worth more than the
amount fixed, fhe obtains an advantage and causes a discrimination forbidden
and made unlawful by the ]Ri.XNs AcT. (32 STAT. AT L. 847, Ch. 7o8, U. S.
ComP. STAT. SuPP. 1911, p. 1309.) Query-Can the carrier in such A case
have an action against the shipper to recover the greater rate? It has been
held, and the court holds in this case, citing authorities therefor, that the
carrier, if he carries at a less rate, cannot 'be compelled to surrender the
goods until the full legal rate has been paid. Indeed the carrier violates the
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ELXINS AcT if he does not insist upon the rate for the true value. But the
shipper apparently, if he makes a mistake in the valuation, has no such right
to correct his mistake, pay the additional charges and collect the full value
of his goods. If he has by wilful misrepresentation misled the carrier, he is
hardly in position to complain, but if, as usually happens, he had no inten-
tion to mislead, and simply accepted the bill of'lading as it was offered him,
without any questions asked, it is not easy to see why he should not have
the same right to claim full value as the carrier has to claim full rates. The
whole difficulty would soon settle itself if the courts held the carrier to lia-
bility for the actual value of the goods, unless it appears that he has in good
faith tried to learn their real value and has been deceived by the shipper.
It can scarcely be claimed. that the present method of fixing valuations in
bills of lading represents any honest attempt by the carrier to learn the true
worth of what he carries. Rather it represents a persistent, and finally suc-
cessful, effort on the part of the carrier to find a way that will be approved
by the court by which he may cut down the liability.
The language of the court in the Carl case is significant, and suggests, at
least, that the court when squarely confronted with the problem will make the
distinction so well set forth by Commissioner LANE in Re Released Rates,
13 I. C. C. R. 55o, between attempts in good faith by the carrier to learn the
value of the goods, and arbitrary valuations known by the courts not to
represent such value. The language of the court is worth quoting: "An
agreement to release such a carrier ,for part of a loss due to negligence is
no more valid than one whereby there is complete exemption. Neither is
such a contract any more valid because it rests upon a consideration than if
it was without consideration."
The court squarely places the ground of limitation of recovery to the
declared or agreed value upon estoppel. In cases where the shipper has reall3y
misled the carrier as to the value of 'his goods this is certainly sound. If,
however, the carrier knew the shipper was not naming the real value, then
he 'was not misled, he did not fix ,his rate in reliance upon -misrepresentation,
and the grounds of estoppel seem to be absent.
Again, the court says in this case, as has been said in substance in many
cases, "If such a valuation be made in good faith, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a lower rate * * *." Further on the court says that such an under-
valuation is a misrepresentation and a violation of the 'ELKINs AcT. How can
a wilful misrepresentation be made in good faith? The tvo statementq seem
to be mutually contradictory. If this ,were a private matter, and carrier and
shipper had connived, the courts might well leave them where they are, but
it is not a private matter, and to allow the carrier to escape his liability by
making such agreements with shippers encourages him to induce all -shippers
to undervalue, as in practice nearly always happens, and this is pretty clearly
contrary to public policy. The carrier by making the difference in rates
excessive, may drive all to undervalue the goods shipped, for if they do not,
they are, as -the court points out in the present cases, subject to discrimination,
which is a violation of the 'ELrINS LAW. There is plenty of evidence fhat
practically all shippers do take the lower rate. See ii MIcH. L. Rv. 464.
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This leads to the last and possibly most important point of these decisions.In ii MIcH. L. Ryv. 463, it is insisted that there has never 
-been a scientificand thorough determination of differences in carrying charges based on thegreater or less risk of the carrier. The Harriman case certainly furnishesa glaring instance of manifestly improper charge, though in this case ithappens not to be in the carrier's favor. The "cost at carrier's risk" was"tio per cent of the rates named in this tariff." Shipments at this higherrate were made "without limitations of carrier's liability at common law!'A more unscientific table of insurance rates could hardly be made. Certainlythe Harriman Bros. could not complain of paying i2o per cent of ordinaryrates in order to increase their insurance from $38o to $Io,64o. This mightseem to furnish some evidence that the public does not care for insuranceby the carrier at all. More probably it shows that the custom to take thelower rate is so universal that the agent of the carrier never shows theshipper any other bill of lading. It would be interesting to knaw if theagent of the carrier ip the present case even had such a bill of lading thatcould be shown, and if the Harriman Bros. really knew that -by paying 2o percent greater carrying charges they could have increased their insurance from$38o to $1o,64o. The important point of this case is that the court decidesthat this question of whether the difference between two rates upon the samecommodity is no more than a reasonable charge by the carrier for the largerresponsibility, is an administrative question, to be. determined by the InterstateCommerce Commission and not by the courts. So far as the courts are con-cerned, the filed and published tariffs must be assumed to have been properlyfixed. If the present rates are not adequate to protect both carrier andshipper, the remedy is by an order of the Commission readjusting the rates.This seems to be a very satisfactory solution, although the finding of theCommission can scarcely be final, for the question of the reasonableness olan order of the Commission is always subject to judicial determination. Thecontention of the shipper in the Carl case-that the rates were not properlyadjusted-the courts refused to consider. , This is doubtless on, the groundthat either carrier or shipper must first get an order from the Commissionbefore the courts will consider this question.Notwithstanding the valuable additions to the law indicated, above, wemust sti'll wait for a final determination of the troublesome question whetheran arbitrary valuation, known by the carrier to bear no relation to the realworth of the goods, a misrepresentation made for the purpose of securingcheaper rates of shipment, is valid. It is interesting to note that in the Carlcase Mr. Justice HUGHns and Mr. Justice PIx'NXY dissent, and that in theHarriman Bros. case Mr. justice "HucrEs concurs in the result, 'while Mr.Justice PlrTvxy dissents. The ground of these dissenting views is not givenin the advanced sheets, but the fact that there is dissent, and many of thestatements in the opinions written by Mr. Justice LuRIow, give. some groundfor the hope that the United States Supreme Court, when it finally passes onthis matter, will agree with the view so ably set forth by Commissioner LAXnin Re Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. R. 550. E. C. G.
